




A Case for Banking Oversight Reform in Crisis
Mitigation
J. Barrow
Kennesaw State University, jbarrow5@kennesaw.edu
S. Smalt
Kennesaw State University, ssmalt@kennesaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/facpubs
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barrow, J. and Smalt, S. (2013). A Case for Banking Oversight Reform in Crisis Mitigation. Economics, Management, and Financial
Markets Journal, 8(4), 2013.
 11 
   
 Economics, Management, and Financial Markets 
 Volume 8(4), 2013, pp. 11–26, ISSN 1842-3191 
 
A CASE FOR BANKING OVERSIGHT REFORM  
IN CRISIS MITIGATION 
 
JANICE M. BARROW 
Jbarrow5@kennesaw.edu 
Kennesaw State University 
STEVEN W. SMALT 
ssmalt@kennesaw.edu 
Kennesaw State University 
 
 
ABSTRACT. This paper reviews the key weaknesses in the banking system related 
to the 2007 global financial crisis and finds supervisory oversight and account- 
ability underrepresented or missing in recommended solutions although they are a 
critical contributor to the problem. The paper purports: (1) focusing on the fun- 
damental factors that attribute to the vulnerability of the banking system is a key 
component of a model for the mitigation of a financial crisis and; (2) the factors are 
interrelated; therefore, the model should be holistic. The analysis results in an 
integrative blueprint and includes a simple case study application. The findings of 
the application support the concept of “regulatory capture”, since regulators could 
and should have been able to identify problem institutions before the crisis and yet 
did not intervene. The application also showed how government bailout, as a strat- 
egy, could be successful in restoring a failing institution. The missing link in being 
able to mitigate a crisis is having effective oversight. Fortunately, the environment 
is more conducive for such reform, in the wake of crises. 
JEL Codes: G01, G28 
 




A review of the literature on factors that led to the 2007 Global Financial 
Crisis (2008 in the USA) reveals that those factors were known to academics 
and regulators, have existed for some time, and continue to exist despite 
regulatory efforts to the contrary (Lal, 2010; Poole, 2010a; Poole, 2010b; 
Scott 2010; Leondis, 2010; Ennis and Keister, 2010). Broadly, the types of 
crises have been classified as either (1) a micro crisis caused by poor bank- 
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ing practices, or (2) a macro crisis caused by sources external to the bank- 
ing system (Klomp 2010). However, identifying the type of crisis seems to 
be the easy part, the more difficult challenge, going forward, is to correctly 
answer the question: What regulation is required to prevent either type of 
crisis from reoccurring? 
 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision created by the central bank 
governors of the Group of Ten nations, other regulatory bodies, academics, 
and practitioners, are all fervently attempting to answer that question. Henry 
Kauffman, a renowned economist, and others, believe there are no quick 
fixes. However, he has identified, fragmentation of accountability, conflict 
of interest in supervision, and outsourcing of due diligence, as key missing 
elements in current discussions. These elements relate to ethical failures in 
the regulation and supervision of the banking system and not so much in the 
failure of institutions to meet regulatory requirements (Murphy, 2010:  Kane, 
2009; Singer, 2009; Sanjeev, 2007; McCormick, 2011, Haan and Osterloo, 
2006). 
 This paper attempts to build a blueprint for the mitigation of future 
financial crises, by first identifying the key fundamental weaknesses in the 
banking system to include inadequate accountability and supervisory over- 
sight as well as operating and systematic risks. Systematic risk is the risk 
that losses are not confined to a single institution, but can be transmitted or 
is capable of being transmitted to the financial system as a whole. This is 
significant because the effects of the failure of the banking system on the 
structure of markets are unpredictable and potentially catastrophic globally. 
The next section, which develops the blueprint, first analyzes the veracity of 
current recommended solutions, and then builds the recommended process 
by addressing and incorporating each weakness. The goal there is to identify 
a method to mitigate future crises using an inclusive, holistic approach. The 
next section provides a simple case study application of the blueprint, which 
proved quite instructive in confirming the validity of the process but also 
identifies a remaining concern. The final section contains the conclusions 
and thoughts for future research. 
 
2. Key Weaknesses in the Banking System 
 
The accountability and supervision variable is underrepresented in the lit- 
erature with the current primary focus being on banking regulation related 
to managing operating and systematic risks. Upon reviewing the literature, 
and including both aspects of the need for regulatory reform, the funda- 
mental weaknesses in the banking system can be classified into five broad 
categories: (1) suboptimal risk-taking incentives; (2) pro-cyclicality; (3) inter- 
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connectedness; (4) unmanaged systematic risk; and (5) inadequate account- 
ability and supervisory oversight. 
 
2.1 Suboptimal Risk-taking Incentives 
 
Barrow and Horvitz (1993) describe how government plays a key role in 
the exacerbation of moral hazard problems within the banking system by: 
• providing deposit insurance; 
• acting as lender of last resort;  
• bailing out institutions considered “too big to fail”; and 
• failing to act upon known problems (forbearance) or by failing to observe/ 
monitor adverse behavior  
 
Moral hazard occurs when there is an absence of accountability for risky or 
incompetent behavior. Boyd (1999) argues that universal banking, where 
banks are permitted to make equity investments, extends the distortion of 
incentives caused by the moral hazards of agency theory to other sectors of 
the economy, and significantly amplifies the problem. 
 Current evidence of how the problem persists is explored by Ratnovski 
(2010) whose analysis finds that banks make suboptimal liquidity choices 
due to distortions created by government bailouts that are unavoidable in a 
systemic crisis. Another example, of the problem which still currently exists, 
is seen in Nier and Bauman (2006) who show how the lack of market dis- 
cipline created by government intervention (or forbearance), results in ex- 
cessive risk taking, and potential conflict of interest between the bank and 
its depositors, and subsequently resulting in the government providing deposit 




Berger and Udel (2004) in assessing the pro-cyclicality of bank lending 
behavior found that lending often increases significantly during business 
cycle expansions, and then falls considerably during subsequent downturns, 
sometimes dramatically enough to be labeled a “credit crunch.” These changes 
in lending are generally more than proportional to the changes in economic 
activity, suggesting that they are changes in bank loan supply that tend to 
accentuate the business cycle. They also found that banks may take sig- 
nificantly more risks during the expansion, but these risks are revealed only 
later because it takes time for loan performance problems to appear. They 
buttressed their arguments further by quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan as saying, “the worst loans are made at the top of the business 
cycle”, May 10, 2001. Chang and Chang’s (2013) research confirmed that 
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CEO’s do indeed push for higher profits and of course higher bonuses 
during periods of growth and prosperity as expected relative to the moral 
hazards of agency theory. Allen and Saunders (2004) further find that the  
literature relating to pro-cyclical tendencies of banking shows how banking 
capital requirements along with monetary policy actually result in the am- 




Mistrulli (2011) shows that, although interbank markets allow banks to 
cope with specific liquidity shocks, at the same time, they may represent a 
channel for contagion as a bank default may spread to other banks through 
interbank linkages. Interconnectedness exacerbates systematic risk whereby 
the failure of one significant institution, can cause or contribute to the failure 
of other significant institutions; and the possibility that one exogenous shock 
may cause or contribute to the failure of multiple significant financial in- 
stitutions (Scott, 2010). Further, in evaluating global interconnectedness, 
Devereux and Sutherland (2011) found that while global financial integration 
in both bond and equity markets improved welfare, it generates high positive 
co-movement across countries, which magnifies the crisis. 
 
2.4 Unmanaged Systematic Risk 
 
Financial institutions play an integral role in the functioning of the economy, 
and are expected to be given proactive priority. However, historically, bank 
regulations tend to be passed in response to various crises rather than to 
prevent them from occurring (Barth et al. 2010; Holowecky et al. 2010). 
Despite the tremendous advances in financial risk measurement, experts 
and analysts alike, failed to predict the recent global financial crisis (Poole, 
2010b). 
 A more concerning issue may not be the systems’ inability to predict a 
financial crisis but its inability to prevent a financial crisis, even if it is 
predicted. Kane (2009) has outline a scenario whereby, in trying to meet 
regulatory capital requirements, institutions turn to private sources of capital, 
he calls shadow entities. These large investors can trigger a silent run and 
completely undermine the stability of a financial institution. These events 
fall under the radar of investors leaving regulators with little option but to 
bailout the affected institution(s) if deemed too big to fail. Unfortunately, 
as Ennis and Keister (2010) conclude, financial crises have a self-fulfilling 
component since banks’ operating structure makes them susceptible to runs, 
and are therefore innately fragile. 
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2.5 Inadequate Accountability and Supervisory Oversight 
 
Kane (2009) attributes the 2007 global crisis to the breakdown in incentives 
of regulators, supervisors, managers and investors to perform adequate due  
diligence over security investments. He also identifies, as a culprit, incentive 
conflicts that undermine the effectiveness of government supervision. In his 
view, undeterred, institutions would engineer assets, liabilities and hedging 
instruments, and ruthlessly exploit weaknesses in various jurisdictions. In 
short, the 2007 global crisis was a product of regulatory environment induced 
innovation that pushed business into unregulated areas. Regulators also, 
incorrectly outsourced the task of risk-assessment to credit agencies that 
did not have the appropriate incentives. 
 Raffer, from as early as 2004, found that the success of market eco- 
nomies is based on linking decisions to risks. Additionally, Kane (2009) 
shows that not only does the current financial system have defective mon- 
itoring, it also fails to make anyone directly accountable for reporting or 
controlling in a conscientious and timely manner. Even the accounting 
system does not report the value of the regulatory benefits, a key factor in 
being able to hold regulators accountable. Both the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) have since added issues related to the crisis to their agendas (FASB 
and IFRS, 2013) 
 Dickson (2010) claims that Canada’s financial system held up well during 
the economic crisis and attributes that to the fact that day-to-day oversight 
is given equal significance to regulatory rules. Dickson further states that 
the financial sector, with strong regulatory rules and sound risk manage- 
ment practices but with weak supervisory oversight, is not safe. The Basel 
Committee has issued three white papers addressing various strategic factors. 
Their focus has been more on rules than on approaches to supervision. In 
fact, the Basel Core Principles for Effective Supervision simply states “The 
Core Principles are neutral with regards to different approaches to super- 
vision, so long as the overriding goals are achieved.” 
 
2.6 Weakness Implications 
 
When taken together, the five weaknesses identified resulted in losses that 
caused key financial institutions to fail, which spread to other interdependent 
institutions, not just locally but nationally and internationally. The interre- 
lationship between the factors is shown in Figure 1 and summarized in 
Table 1. As depicted in the figure, it is the failure of supervisory oversight 
that allowed the other weaknesses to successfully undermine the financial 
system. 
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 Teply (2010) noticed that Basel II addressed only credit, market and 
operational risks. Missing in coverage were risks such as market, off-balance 
sheet, systematic, contagion and unknown events. One lesson learned is that 
each of those risks supports the need for better oversight and accountability 
by regulators, risk managers, management, investors and the government. 
Table 1 summarizes the weaknesses and the causes. All the factors can be 
related to inadequate supervisory oversight and accountability. 
 
Fig. 1 Fundamental weaknesses in the banking system 
 
This Figure 1 demonstrates that breaches in supervisory oversight  
and accountability leave the financial system vulnerable 
 
Table 1 Summary of the fundamental weaknesses  
              in the banking system and the causes 
 
Weakness Causes 




















Lack of market  
discipline  









Inadequate Accountability and 
Supervisory oversight 
 
Counter-cyclical business operations 
 
Interbank markets 
Vulnerability to liquidity shocks 
Contagion across linked institutions 
 
Inability to predict and prevent a crisis 
Use of large/significant shadow entities 
 
 
Breakdown in incentives of  
regulators Exploitation of  
weaknesses in jurisdiction Lack  
of day-to-day oversight 
 
This Table 1 identifies the summarizes the causes of  
the fundamental weakness to the banking 
 
Prospective oversight ethics dictate that oversight institutions should be de- 
signed to, effectively, prevent wrongs. Unfortunately, overseers face a sig- 
nificant moral hazard problem to not engage in vigilant oversight. This 
problem is further exacerbated by the possibility of “regulation capture” 
which states that regulatory vigilance decreases in the absence of a crisis. 
Inspectors become too close to the inspected and the capacity for independent 
judgment is undermined or lost. (Swartz, 2008) 
 
3. A Blueprint for the Mitigation of a Financial Crisis 
 
This paper purports that: (1) focusing on the five fundamental factors that 
attribute to the vulnerability of the banking system is a key component of a 
model for the mitigation of a financial crisis and; (2) the factors are inter- 
related; therefore, the model should be holistic and inclusive of supervisory 
oversight and accountability. We begin by looking at the veracity of the 
solutions already proposed. We will then provide a process to prevent or 
mitigate future financial crises by focusing on the fundamental weaknesses 
presented in the previous section. This involves managing systematic risk; 
identifying factors that can signal trouble and trigger intervention; and 
providing for regulatory accountability and oversight. 
 
3.1 The Veracity of Proposed Solutions 
 
Scott (2010) summarizes solutions provided by academics and regulators 
include recommendations to:  
• alter capital requirements;  
• change clearing houses usage requirements;  
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• alter the way insolvent institutions are resolved;  
• continue emergency lending by the Fed, and  
• restructure the regulatory system. 
 
All such solutions have been argued to be burdensome and ineffective to 
prevent a systematic risk based crisis. Evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
these proposed solutions is seen in the failure of Basel II, passed in 2004, 
which did not prevent the crisis. The Basel III documents, submitted in 
2009, attempted to improve the regulation of the financial system but still 
leaves significant systematic risk exposure which is one of the main factors 
that helped cause the crisis in the first place (Boerner, 2010; Holbrook, 
2010; Weber, 2010; Triana, 2010). 
 For example, Berger et al. (2008) show that Bank Holding Companies 
(BHC) had been actively managing their capital ratios, had set targets sub- 
stantially above regulatory minima and made rapid adjustments towards 
those targets. Even the new regulatory requirements under Basel III would 
not have been adequate to prevent the crisis. Triana (2010) further shows that 
Basel III: permits higher leverage (higher risk); has flawed risk measures; 
and restricts opportunities for higher potential returns – increases risks and 
lowers returns. Elimination of bailing-out failing banks is also not at option 
because as Ennis and Keister (2010) conclude, financial crises have a self-
fulfilling component and that the banks’ operating structure makes them 
susceptibility to runs and so they are innately fragile. Additionally, Mistrulli 
(2011) found, after doing simulations, that by allowing conglomerates to 
recapitalize their affiliates which otherwise would fail, the resilience to 
financial contagion of the banking system tends to improve. 
 Prospective oversight ethics dictate that overseers prevent wrongs and 
retrospective oversight ethics entails the conduct of investigations into the 
failure of existing institutions in preventing wrong with an aim to improve- 
ment. Both processes failed. Unfortunately, policy makers are susceptible to 
economic, political, cultural and bureaucratic pressures, and although recom- 
mendations for an international oversight body has merit, its application  
would face, possibly insurmountable, blockades. 
 
3.2. An Integrative Blueprint for Crisis Mitigation 
 
Given that the banking system is fundamentally frail (Ennis and Keister, 
2010) and that recapitalization, such as bailouts, improve the resilience to 
financial contagion (Mistrulli, 2011), it is, therefore, recommended that 
these agency theory issues not be addressed by removing the governmental 
safeguards that contribute to the agency problem. Additionally, according 
to Allen and Saunders (2004) U.S. banking regulators have contended that 
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15–20 major banks and 5–10 major securities firms dominate critical finan- 
cial markets, therefore as global financial markets consolidate and harmonize 
the possibility of contagion risk increases. However, this smaller list of key 
players could provide a more narrowly focused intervention/mitigation strat- 
egy. 
 In terms of pro-cyclicality, Franz (2010) has shown that the stock market 
has been highly consistent in predicting economic expansions and contrac- 
tions. Allen and Saunders (2004) found that, whereas a fundamentally 
strong institution can often recover from market and credit risk, it might be 
impossible for it to recover from certain operational risk events. Therefore, 
the main concerns are the low frequency/high severity risk events, which 
occur quite infrequently, consistent with the conditions precedent. These 
factors as well as the regulators’ inability to monitor all financial institutions, 
reinforces the recommendation to focus on the smaller list of key players. 
 Measures of interconnectivity relate to size and so, once again, identi- 
fication of those major banks and securities firms, that dominate the market, 
is critical. Also related to size and interconnectedness is measured by the 
composition of the banks’ asset portfolio (Drumond, 2009). 
 All the factors are inter-related and therefore attribute to the systematic 
risk problem. Since macroeconomic factors are affected by government ac- 
tions, macroeconomic and firm specific factors must be dealt with separately 
(Tsai and Chang, 2010). Their model establishes financial factors, market 
variables and macroeconomic variables to successfully predict financial 
distress. Therefore, it is recommended that the holistic interception model 
incorporates a financial distress prediction model, to identify firm specific 
risks such a discrete-time hazard model like the multi-period logit model, 
which has been used successfully to estimate the significant parameters in 
predicting financial distress (Tsai and Chang, 2010, Shunway 2001; Barrow, 
1993). In its application, it is assumed that there is some linear combination 
of the independent variables that is positively related to financial distress. The 
parameters in the logit model can then be used to identify problem financial 
institutions in conjunction with a predetermined distress cut-off point. 
 Given that, regulators and academics have known of the weaknesses and 
challenges for some time, key missing elements are supervisory oversight 
and accountability. According to Schwartz (2008) there are three critical 
elements to oversight duties. They are (1) set standards, (2) provide resources 
that enable overseers to gather information about the extent to which stan- 
dards are being met, and (3) the provide tools for modifying the behavior of 
non-compliance. This third element is where accountability becomes even 
more important. 
 Research shows that most crises were caused by failures in supervisory 
oversight and accountability. Coffee (2011) finds that regulatory supervision 
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is likely to follow a “sine curve” which means that there is usually stricter 
regulation after a crash followed by gradual relaxation. However, research 
also found that crises that had more long-term and widespread significance 
were more likely to have more sustainable regulatory changes. (Schwartz, 
2008). Given the large scale and scope of the recent global financial crisis, 
and the greater visibility, there is also a greater chance for more sustainable 
changes in regulatory processes, supervisory oversight and accountability. 
 Summarized the blueprint recommends using a holistic approach. Spe- 
cifically: 
1. Maintain the governmental safeguards despite the related moral hazard 
problems, given the fragility of the banking system. 
2. Identify a small list of key players to provide a more narrowly-focused 
intervention/mitigation strategy. 
3. Utilize a financial distress prediction model, such a discrete-time hazard 
model like the multi-period logit model, to identify firm specific risks and 
systematic risks. 
4. Maintain strong regulatory rules that provide for oversight and account- 
ability with cause-effect related enforced consequences. 
 
4. A Simple Application of the Process 
 
A simple analysis was done to illustrate the importance of closely monitor- 
ing those flagged for intervention and using the stock market as a proxy for 
economic activity. The stock market was chosen since it has been shown 
that the S&P 500 is highly consistent in anticipating contractions and ex- 
pansions in economic activity, and it is assumed that the stock market is 
consistent in anticipating economic cycles (Franz, 2010). Fundamental com- 
pany data was provided by Capital IQ, a business owned by the Standard 
and Poor’s Company and accessible from Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). Capital IQ provides market data across all major quoted markets 
including: equity, mutual funds, fixed income, indices, commodities, cur- 
rencies, and rates. Equity pricing data includes close, open, bid, ask, mid, 
low, best, high price values along with volume, splits, dividends, ticker, 
exchange information, short interest data, and VWAP for select markets.  
 There were two key sources of banking data used to identify banks “too 
big to fail” and those that would have the most significant impact related  
to pro-cyclicality and interconnectedness. The first is from WRDS, a web-
based business data research service from The Wharton School at the Uni- 
versity of Pennsylvania. Their Bank Regulatory Database contains five data- 
bases for regulated depository financial institutions. These  databases  provide  
accounting data for bank holding companies, commercial banks, savings 
banks, and savings and loans institutions. Their data comes from the required 
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regulatory forms filed for supervising purposes. The second source of data 
is from the National Information Center (NIC), a central repository of data 
about banks and other institutions for which the Federal Reserve has a 
supervisory, regulatory and/or research interest, including both domestic and 
foreign banking organizations operating in the United States. Their web 
site provides access to NIC data, allowing the public to search for detailed 
information about banking organizations. 
 The NIC has a Bank Holding Company Peer Groups report that contains 
a summary of peer group financial data and a listing of Bank Holding Com- 
panies (BHCs) in each Peer Group. BHCs with assets over $500 million are 
classified into one of nine tiers. Tier 1 consists of BHCs with consolidated 
assets of $10 Billion and over. Given that only the top 20 or so financial 
institutions dominate the financial markets, the top tier 1 banks with con- 
solidated assets of $100 billion were selected for review. There were 22 
institutions that met the criteria. These are the main institutions to monitor 
in addressing the interconnectedness and pro-cyclicality systematic risks 
considerations and therefore, the key financial institutions that should play 
a major role in the financial crisis intervention or mitigation process. Note, 
however, that the number is not static. Upon retrieving the data it was dis- 
covered that due to various reasons, such as reorganizations (TD Bank Hold- 
ing Company, U.S. Bankcorp, Ally Financial Inc. and Citizens Financial 
Group) or being privately held (Taunu Corporations), there were only 17 
BHCs with complete market price data for analysis. 
 Figure 2 shows the correlation between the 17 remaining top BHCs and 
the S&P 500, A clear outlier was institution number 11, Capital One Finan- 
cial Corporation (COF). This would form a basis for further investigation. 
Figure 3 show COF’s correlation trend for the 10 year period which includes 
fives before the signal and the four years since, including the crises period. 
This confirms that, indeed, 2006 was a significant year for COF when 
compared to other BHCs, but it was also significant for COF over that the 
ten-year period of 2001–2010. Capital One Financial was the recipient of 
$3.56 billion of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act Federal bailout 
in the form of a preferred stock purchase. (WRDS, 2010). However, accord- 
ing to ProPublica (retrieved 7/21/2011) COF returned its bailout funds on 
June 9, 2009 with an additional $253 million dollars profit to the government. 
 
4.1. Application of Findings 
 
This case study application is quite instructive. It showed that early iden- 
tification of the COF’s financial problems, as early as 2006, prior to the  crisis,  
was possible and, indeed, probable. It also showed that government bailout 
as a strategy can be successful in preventing bankruptcy, and that it does not 
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have to be at a net loss to taxpayers. However, the possibility that regulators/ 
supervisors knew of the problem prior to 2008 yet did nothing, is real and 
of concern. This supports Coffee (2010) in his claim that even if a failure is 
predicted there will be intense and well financed push back from the in- 
stitution and behaviors consistent with “regulatory capture.” Regulatory 
capture occurs when bureaucrats, regulators, and politicians cease to serve 
the collective public interest and begin to systematically favor specific vested 
interests, usually the very interests they were supposed to regulate and re- 
strain (Baker, 2010). 
 Coffee’s (2011) ‘sine curve” theory shows that there is a higher prob- 
ability for stricter regulatory supervision following a crisis but it is followed 
by a gradual relaxation. Baker (2010) further shows that regulatory capture 
has evolved over 20 years. Regulatory easing has facilitated innovation, 
incompletely regulated “shadow banking sector”, and with a boom, created 
serious disincentives for politicians to take corrective actions. When a crisis 
creates sufficient awareness and concern such that other countries become 
more involved in the process; the environment becomes conducive to mak- 
ing some meaningful changes regarding supervision and more accountability 
within the financial system. The assumption is that there will be gradual  
relaxation on the urgency as the economy recovers and so accountability 
reformers need to act quickly before reform losses support. To prevent the 
conflict of interests/moral hazard problem within regulatory agencies, the 
focus should include a greater social and intellectual heterogeneity, repre- 
senting a broader range of constituents. (Baker, 2010) 
 
Fig. 2 Plot of the correlation coefficients for  
           the 17 BHCs by size in 2006 
 
This figure 2 shows the correlation coefficient (r) between the monthly  
S&P 500 indices and the stock price of the top 17 BC for the year 2006.   
The outlier in 2006 was Capital One Financial Corporation. 
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Fig. 3 Plot of the correlation coefficients  
          for Capital One for 2001–2010 
 
This figure 3 shows the correlation coefficient (r) between the monthly  
S&P 500 indices and the stock price of Capital One Financial Corporation  




This paper reviewed the literature on factors that led to the Global Finan- 
cial Crisis and finds that those factors had been known and identified for 
several years prior to the crisis, yet that knowledge failed to assist in the 
interception of the crisis, and those same factors continue to exist despite 
regulatory efforts to the contrary. Also significant is the underrepresentation 
of accountability and supervisory oversight, in proposed solutions, although 
they are an integral part of the problem. Five fundamental weaknesses in 
the banking system were identified, broadly, as suboptimal risk-taking in- 
centives, pro-cyclicality, interconnectedness, unmanaged systematic risk, and 
inadequate accountability and supervisory oversight. 
 The paper purports that: (1) focusing on the five fundamental factors 
that attribute to the vulnerability of the banking system is a key component 
to a model for interception of a financial crisis and; (2) the factors are inter- 
related; therefore, the model should be holistic in managing the systematic 
risks that could lead to a crisis. Summarized, the model makes four recom- 
mendations. First, maintain the governmental safeguards despite the related 
moral hazard problems, given the fragility of the banking system. Second, 
identify a small list of key players to provide a more narrowly focused in- 
tervention/mitigation strategy. Third, utilize a financial distress prediction 
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model, such a discrete-time hazard model like the multi-period logit model, 
to identify firm specific risks and systematic risks. Finally, maintain strong 
regulatory rules that provide for oversight and accountability with cause-
effect related enforced consequences. 
 A simple application of the blueprint was done to illustrate the importance 
of closely monitoring those institutions that were flagged for intervention, 
using stock price and S&P 500 index data provided by Capital IQ, a busi- 
ness owned by the Standard and Poor’s Company. Upon analyzing the data 
for 2006, a year or two before the crisis became widespread knowledge, a 
significant outlier was identified to be Capital One Financial Corporation 
(COF), which received approximately $ 3.56 billion dollars in federal bail- 
out, but was able to return the bailout funds, with interest, in 2009. The 
application has been very instructive in validating the bailout strategy as 
being feasible but it was also instructive in supporting the possibility of 
“regulatory capture” in that the regulators should have known of the prob- 
lem but had done nothing. If this is the case, and other research does 
supports it, then regulatory supervision and accountability is the remaining 
missing link to the mitigation of future financial crisis and must be a central 
part of regulatory reform. 
 Evidence also substantiates the assumption that support for reform is 
highest immediately after a crisis, but then starts to wane as the economy 
recovers. Given the widespread and global impact of the recent financial 
crises, the environment is very conducive for support and, therefore, for 
change. This paper sets the scene for continuing research effort aimed at 
integrating accountability and supervision into the reform process. Further 
study and extensions of the findings of this paper could then provide for 
specific strategic and tactical recommendations for that integration as well 
as to present and test a quantitative, quantifiable model for crisis mitigation 
that incorporates accountability and supervisory oversight, beyond the simple 
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